## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 18, 2015

**TO**: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director

**FROM:** P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending September 18, 2015

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). There were two contamination spreads, one set of elevated lapel sample readings, and one loss of supply air to a worker using Level B personal protective equipment (PPE) at PFP. The most significant contamination spread occurred on the duct level where workers were moving a negative air machine (NAM). Loose contamination apparently escaped from the NAM. Although workers surveyed the unit before the movement, no surveys were performed after it was relocated. The escaped contamination was subsequently tracked around the duct level by workers. The spread was discovered by a radiological control technician during courtesy surveys that are routinely performed during work activities. Work was secured in the duct level pending decontamination of the affected area. The spread will most likely require the duct level to retain posting as a high contamination area (HCA) vice a contamination area (with isolated HCAs to support work) for the near term. No individuals were contaminated beyond their external PPE or injured during any of the events.

RL approved a request by the contractor to remove the PFP confinement ventilation system from the list of vital safety systems.

**618-10 Burial Ground.** The contractor performed a Readiness Assessment (RA) for remediation of Vertical Pipe Units (see Activity Report 08/11/2015). The RA excluded several core requirements since they had been assessed in other recent RAs. The RA team concluded the activity was ready to startup following resolution of remaining Management Self Assessment findings and two RA pre-start findings. RL observers noted that more rigorous radiological monitoring and contamination control is necessary during one part of the operation.

**300 Area.** A worker performing routine surveys discovered radiological contamination in a non-radiological industrial remediation site. The contractor stopped work at the remediation site, posted the area as a soil contamination area, and sequestered all the containers in transit to the Environmental Remediation and Disposal Facility. Recovery actions are in progress.

**Tank Farms.** Retrieval of Tank C-105 was shut down at the beginning of the week following identification of a mass balance discrepancy by an ORP facility rep. Retrieval resumed later in the week upon resolution of the discrepancy.

**242-A Evaporator.** The contractor started campaign EC-03 which is currently running steadily.

**Sludge Retrieval Project (SRP).** The DOE EM Office of Project Assessment (EM-53) conducted a project peer review (PPR) of the SRP. The purpose of the PPR was to evaluate the project's readiness for a consolidated Critical Decision (CD) 2 and 3, and the upcoming External Independent Review. The assessment team assessed potential impact from open technical issues and whether the project team has implemented appropriate quality assurance controls to ensure project success. The assessment team will issue a final report in October.